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## **Buddhist Compassion and the Moral Nihilism Quantum Non-matter**

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The world we all live in today is a 'prison planet'. Slavery and poverty is rampant; inundating every corner of the globe (see Bales, 2004). Environmental destruction is relentless, forests are vanishing, pollution is unprecedented, animal species extinction is widespread. Use of anti-depressant and anti-stress medications is skyrocketing, and world citizens are forgetting the religious life in order to chase lifestyles that only bring disorientation and dissatisfaction. War is widespread, new diseases are appearing, and crime rates are escalating worldwide. The purpose of this article is to show that there is an escape from prison planet: Buddhist compassion. Buddhist compassion, as I will use the term in this article, is the realization that you are not different from me. With this realization, the popular concept of an isolated self is revealed to be not real. It can be verified that Buddhist compassion pervades all conscious beings; but most humans have forgotten that it exists: they have forgotten this since they have forgotten who and what they are, which is nirvanic. According to Buddha, hate is not conquered by hate: hate is conquered by love. This is an eternal law. Many do not know that we are here in this world to live in harmony. Those who know this do not fight against each other.

As Buddha indicates, it is not widely known that people are supposed to live in harmony with one another. Another way to put this

is: few know that conscious beings are not separate or distinguishable (which is a Mahāyānist sort of Buddhist compassion) due to the fact that all persons are nirvanic. Residing in Samsara (forgetting one is nirvanic) prevents conscious beings from understanding this. Buddha also points out that this Buddhist compassion is 'law', which apparently means it is the way of things, and thus those who do not understand this law are deluded.

In addition to following the Mahāyāna position on Buddhist compassion, I will also be concerned with Dharmakīrti's philosophy of Buddhist atomism, which appears to be the correct account of Buddhism. In fact, Dharmakīrti's work leads to a philosophy of moral nihilism which, interestingly, leads to the maximum level of Buddhist compassion. The sort of Buddhist moral nihilism that will be discussed in this article is not moral anarchy or moral inversion, both of which lead to cruelty toward other conscious beings. Rather, it is a state of indifferent non-judgment and inaction—all central to Buddhist compassion. Only with this Buddhist moral nihilism can conscious beings attain deep Buddhist compassion for all conscious beings. The findings lead to the conclusion that all conscious beings contain a deep compassion for one another (i.e., they are not distinct from one another), but as evidenced by the state of the contemporary war-torn world, few have remembered this inside themselves (i.e., as the dynamo of their subjectivity).

## **Quantum Atomic Non-matter**

### ***The 'Standard Interpretation' of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy***

Before discussing the theory of nihilistic Buddhist compassion, some issues will be discussed now. In this article the correctness of, what Dreyfus calls 'the standard interpretation' of Dharmakīrti's philosophy will be used. This is as follows:

... only infinitesimal atoms and moments of consciousness are real. Everything else, such as a shape or a colour, is real only inasmuch as it is taken as an object of conventional practice. This view is not unlike Wilfrid Sellars's claim that objects such as table, ice cubes, and colours do not really exist. Our commonsense notions of such objects are false but cognitively useful ... . Several traditional and modern scholars have explained Dharmakīrti in this way, emphasizing that in

his system reality is reducible to partless atoms interacting with moments of consciousness ... . This causal relation explains our perceptions of extended objects. In reality, there is no extension but just the causal interaction of infinitesimal atoms with partless moments of consciousness. This interpretation of Dharmakīrti's ontology can be called *the standard interpretation*. (Dreyfus, 1997: 85)

### ***Quantum Blob Theory: Properties do Not Exist***

The argument in this article involves the philosophy of blob theory (reality is an undifferentiated being: distinctionless, propertyless). Consider a passage about Nagārjuna by Raju:

The aim of Nagārjuna is to show that nothing positive or negative can be asserted of reality. It is therefore *Sūnya* (Vacuity, Emptiness). Even to think of it as *Sunya* is a mistake, because the concepts and vacuity and emptiness are understood with reference to full ... . But Nagārjuna's dialectic goes deeper, and the linguistic analysts can find much that interests them in it ... . Let us take vacuity. What is vacuous is something devoid of space, it is not vacuous. If it is devoid of space, then it contains a reference to space, in fact, a reference to all the things of which it is devoid. That means it contains this reference. Then how can it be vacuous. ... It was, again, Nagārjuna who first enunciated and worked out the doctrine that the world was never born and is not there (*Ajātivāda*), which also was later adopted by some of the *Advaita Vedantins*. If everything is false and unreal, am I unreal? Is the pen I am writing with unreal? Nagārjuna says that I am not, nothing is. The world was not, is not, and will not be there. There is no question of the world of action even, because action, like all the other concepts, is self-contradictory and, therefore, false. All is *Sūnya*, Nirvana. (Raju, 1998: 128–129)

According to this passage, ordinary empirical reality is not real. Ordinary empirical reality is a reality of structure and distinction. The inverse of that is a reality of structureless and undifferentiated being: a reality that is ineffable. This is what is involved with blob theory: reality is flashing (vibrating), propertyless, indistinguishable, energy points, and the surfaces and colour-patches witnessed in ordinary empirical consciousness are illusions (Samsara). Consider what Stcherbatsky (1962: 85) writes about 'qualityless' ultimate reality:

Every point-instant may be viewed as a particle of Time, as a particle of Space and as a sensible quality, but this difference is only a difference of our mental attitude ... towards that point-instant. The point-instant itself, the ultimate reality cut loose from all imagination is qualityless, timeless and indivisible.

When a conscious being uses language, they assign meanings and symbols onto observed items in ordinary empirical reality. These meanings and symbols are about the properties of the appearances of the items of Samsaric ordinary empirical reality. In fact, the only items that are in ordinary empirical reality are properties of things (specifically, surface and colour properties). But if there is no language that can denote any real (non-conceptual) objects, as the above passage about Nagārjuna implies when it shows us that all concepts are unreal (self-contradictory), then that indicates that there are no properties at all. This is because if there were properties, then language would have the power to denote, which the passages just given indicate cannot be the case. But there are stronger reasons than this to assert that blob theory is correct.

According to the philosophy of quantum blob theory, quantum atoms (partless quantum particles, such as the electron or quark) do not have properties, own being or materiality (Grupp, 2006a, 2006b). According to this quantum theory of Buddhism, '...there is no matter at all, flashes of energy follow one another and produce the *illusion* of stabilized phenomena' (Stcherbatsky, 1962: 83 emphasis added). Charge, spin, mass and other alleged 'differences' that physicists believe they witness among quantum atoms are all descriptions of how quantum atoms are observed (represented) through the quantum physicist's computer monitor in the particle accelerator lab. This is, however, a representation that contains serious distortions (see Grupp, 2006b for copious information on this issue), and is not the nirvanic direct apprehension of the ultimate quantum entities. Nirvana is direct observation of flashing quantum atoms; to see that they are real and the ordinary empirical reality is not. The nirvanic observer will directly apprehend 'many' philosophical atoms with the third eye, but will report (if she reports anything) that there is only one, since they are all indistinguishable. Elsewhere I have called this mereological nihilism, Buddhist atomism, quantum non-matter, quantum blob atomism, blob theory, the mereological nihilist interpretation of quantum mechanics, quantum

Buddhism, and quantum abstract atomism, where that last two terms are the ones that will be used hereafter in this article. The realization that reality is a vibrating quantum blob—which is remembered through mindfulness—is to understand that materiality (surface and colour properties) is not real, and that only immateriality (vibrating quantum abstract atoms) is real. This realization is an escape from the prison planet: a release from the prison by understanding that the prison never existed, there was always only nirvana.

One can note that the nirvanic, the ultimate reality that Stcherbatsky is describing is an atomic reality—not the atomic reality of the ancient Buddhists, but a later pre-classical development in Indian Buddhism initiated by Dharmakîrti. He proposed ‘that the study of [Buddhist] logic and epistemology has to replace the ancient philosophy of early Buddhism’ (Stcherbatsky, 1962: 37). The quantum atomism of Dharmakîrti was not a Greek-like four-element atomistic theory as it was a surprisingly modern-sounding quantum mechanics, where it was discovered that ‘[t]he sensible world consists of sensibilia which are but momentary flashes of energy’ (ibid.: 79).<sup>1</sup> It can be shown that Dharmakîrti’s quantum mechanics (and perhaps, some perspectives on Mahāyāna Buddhism) involves blob theory.

### ***The Mereological Nihilist Interpretation of Quantum Buddhism***

Three standpoints will be used here to analyse Buddhist compassion:

- (i) The interpretation of Buddhism given by Sautrāntika and Nagārjuna.
- (ii) The account of Buddhism given by Dharmakîrti.
- (iii) The account of empirical quantum mechanics just discussed which is called the mereological nihilist interpretation of quantum mechanics (see Grupp, 2006b).

It can be shown that a thoroughgoing and hard-nose empirical perspective of quantum mechanical reality is the correct view of reality (and thus other positions, such as the Realist, Einsteinian, and other metaphysical positions—including the other non-nihilist interpretations of quantum mechanics, which are metaphysical theories—are incorrect) (Grupp, 2005, 2006a, 2006b). Reality is best described according to the philosophies of mereological nihilism and blob theory, which are



identical to the aforementioned hard-nosed and strictly empirical account of quantum physics. According to this strictly empirical interpretation of quantum physics, the data of quantum physics is non-interpretive (it does not involve interpretations of data that lead to, for example, wave-particle duality or probability clouds, which are not empirical findings, but are metaphysical theories and assumptions)<sup>2</sup>, only involving the most rudimentary empirical findings of quantum mechanics, and which avoids the famous paradoxes (absurdities, contradictions) of quantum physics. According to the mereological interpretation of Buddhism, which is also called blob theory or quantum abstract atomism, reality is found to be immaterial, and consisting of indistinguishable points of energy that flicker (flash, vibrate, pulsate) in and out of existence:

... the only objects that exist are quantum objects that do not have parts, such as electrons, quarks, and any other *partless* quantum objects. Hereafter, I will call these 'quantum atoms', 'quantum philosophical atoms', or 'quantum abstract atoms', for reasons I will clarify ... The data of experimental quantum physics reveals that the partless quantum abstract atoms are point-sized (sizeless), unstructured, non-material, surfaceless, non-interacting, irreducible, and perhaps indistinguishable quantum objects (true philosophical *atoms*) that have an incredibly short-lived and/or nearly instantaneous existence. Philosophical reasoning will also be given later in this article to show that philosophical argumentation about the quantum realm is in agreement with these experimental findings. These experimental findings of quantum physics show that quantum objects are not the sorts of items that can constitute macroscopic objects—or any objects whatsoever: material constitution is an illusion, and thus everyday ordinary empirical-material reality is some sort of a dream (Grupp, 2006b: 246).

There are only two perspectives conscious beings can have, nirvanic and Samsaric, or, in other words:

1. Ignorance (Dukkha): An ordinary empirical perspective, which is associated with the experience of extension (surfaces and colours), and which does not involve perception of the flashing immaterial quantum blob atoms.
2. Mereological nihilism: A quantum perspective, which is nirvanic experience, and the awareness that 1 does not exist (1 is illusion).

According to this position, an observer directly apprehends (i.e., perceives without the five senses) the immaterial flashing quantum blob atoms.

Now 2 follows from the thesis that Buddhist logic is concerned with the mereological nihilist's findings. Specifically, mereological nihilism is the theory that objects with parts do not exist, which is empirically verified by quantum physics. Stcherbatsky (1962: 86) writes in his *Buddhist Logic*, in a section entitled 'Duration and Extension Are Not Real', and in a passage about Buddhist opposition to the Realists, that '[f]or the Buddhists the parts alone are real, the whole is a fiction'. Dreyfus writes:

Extended objects cannot be identified with their atomic parts, since they are extended (assuming they exist) and atoms are infinitesimally small. They cannot be different either, for in this case they would exist apart from these atoms. Since they are not one either, we have to conclude that extended objects do not exist externally. Why, then, are we perceiving extended objects if they do not exist? Dharmakîrti answers: 'The appearance of cognition, which is not distinct [from its object], as being so is indeed a distortion.' ... Our perception of extended objects is without support in the external world and therefore mistake. Extended objects appear to exist separate from our consciousness, but in reality they do not exist externally. We perceive them as such, however, because our perceptions are distorted. (Dreyfus, 1997: 102)

Mereological nihilism also leads to blob theory.

### ***Blob Theory (Propertylessness) in Dharmakîrti's Philosophy***

'Ontology is closely linked to the question of whether universals exist ... . Ontologically, such entities can be considered properties that individuals instantiate' (ibid.: 49). But universals (properties) do not exist, according to Dharmakîrti's post-ancient formulation of Buddhism; rather, they are mental illusions, fabrications, as Dreyfus points out:

Against the Nyāya realism, Dharmakîrti develops a conceptualist theory of universals. The essential difference between the two lies in that, whereas for the Nyāya universals are real, for Dharmakîrti they are not. Dharmakîrti holds that universals have only nominal

existence. They are constructed by conceptuality on the basis of our experiences of resemblances. In short, they are generally characterized phenomena ... . [U]niversals as posited by realists have contradictory attributes, a clear sign that they fail to satisfy the ... conditions of real phenomena ... . Therefore, they are not real. Dharmakîrti explains: 'If [this universal] is distinct from [its particulars], then it is unrelated to them. Therefore, it is established as being essenceless. It does not follow [from that] that nonexistents are kinds because they do not depend on their [particulars]. Therefore, this kind which is unreal and constructed on the basis of [real] entities is revealed by words for the sake of relating to particulars.' Universals are not real because they are not part of the causal network that is reality ... . Only when thinking mind intervenes do universals come to be. (ibid.: 143)

If properties do not exist, then we arrive at a conceptualist and an extreme nominalist philosophy<sup>3</sup> that is often described as blob theory (Moreland, 2001: 74). Properties are not real items separate from Samsaric consciousness; but rather, properties are conceptual resemblances, and thus are fabrications of resemblances in Samsaric consciousness:

... the world is not made of enduring substances with changing qualities. Rather, change [vibration] itself is the essence of reality. Things that appear to endure unchanged are, in fact, a succession. Reality is made only of events that flash in and out of existence. Every real happening in the universe is due to the arising and disappearing of countless events [i.e., countless flashing atoms] that cause it. Even the continuity of things is due to successive phenomena—events that closely resemble each other. (Dreyfus, 1997: 61)

For reasons given in this subsection, we can see that Dharmakîrti's Buddhism involves quantum blob theory. This understanding will be important when moral nihilism and Buddhist compassion will be discussed below.

### ***Quantum Abstract Atoms do not have Own-being***

A critical issue of blob theory and the mereological nihilist interpretation of quantum Buddhism is the Sautrāntika view that momentary events (Buddhist quantum atoms) do not have own-being. Consider what Mitchell writes about the Sautrāntika:



They ... accepted the notion of momentariness, but understood it more in terms of the Buddha's teaching of impermanence. That is, while life is a series of momentary events, its elements do not have any own-being. So the fundamental elements of existence are not separate and self-subsisting, but are interconnected parts of the impermanent flow of existence. (Mitchell, 2002: 128)

If properties do not exist, as blob theory involves, there is no property of haecceity that can be exemplified by bare (propertyless) quantum abstract atoms and thus individuality or selfdom cannot be possessed by any quantum atom. For that reason, the Sautrāntika theory that entities do not have own being follows from blob theory.

This is all that is borrowed from the Sautrāntika, and while Mitchell's passage is interesting, it is cited here partly to show its error. A lack of own-being of any entities is not about the 'interconnectedness of things', but rather about the indistinguishability of immaterial 'things' (quantum abstract atoms). My point is to advance Buddhism so that it is more in accord with nirvanic observation as being identical to with the strictly empirical findings of quantum mechanics. A primary issue in this interpretation of quantum Buddhism is the idea that nothing is interconnected, and that there are no connections and metaphysical relations whatsoever; and rather there are only quantum abstract atoms, and the quantum abstract atoms are indistinguishable from one another:

[Q]uantum philosophical atoms are indistinguishable particles that are not coinciding (not overlapping): quantum atoms share all the same *perceived* properties, and thus from what is observed about them through quantum instrumentation, those observations do not provide data that allow quantum researchers to clearly distinguish quantum abstract atoms from one another ... . The famous physicists, Brown and Davies, write: 'All members of a given particle species are identical; there is no way to distinguish, say, one electron from another'. (Grupp, 2006b: 249–50)

At a quick glance, it may seem that this account of quantum abstract Buddhist atomism may be promoting a Realist fallacy, on the order of the Realist fallacy described by Stcherbatsky (1962: 86):

According to the Realists empirical things have a limited real duration ... . The atoms combine and form real new unities. These created unities reside, or inhere ... in the atoms. Thus we have one

real things simultaneously residing in a multitude of atoms, i.e., in many places. This is impossible ... for if it were a reality, it would be a reality residing at once in many places, i.e., a reality at once residing and not residing in a given place.

This Realist account involves two primary issues: there are wholes, and there are multiply-located atoms. But the mereological interpretation of quantum mechanics involves a rejection of each of these two Realist absurdities. According to quantum Buddhism, space (location, place) does not exist and wholes composed of parts do not exist, and the mereological nihilist interpretation of quantum mechanics does not involve the Realist fallacies. If space does not exist, then there is no location. If two indistinguishable quantum abstract atoms are apprehended either in the particle accelerator lab or amid direct nirvanic apprehension, then it is not correct to assert that they are at different locations. It would be correct to assert that they are nowhere, and thus are not multiply-located (i.e., there is no relationalist matrix of space nor a substantivalist container of space, that these atoms exist amid, rather, they just are, and there is nothing more that can be asserted).

### **The Inevitability of Harm to Self and Others without Buddhism**

Having established the Buddhist quantum philosophy that will be used to build a theory of Buddhist compassion here, another issue will now be discussed that is critical to the theory: the thesis that non-nirvanic beings can only be filled with hate and violence toward one another. This finding indicates that the philosophy of Buddhist compassion is critically important for all conscious beings to understand (i.e., to remember), lest our prison planet turn for the worse. According to Buddhism, we inevitably harm and have spite toward others. Consider the following argument, which has been pointed out by the Dalai Lama and which is found in Dharmakîrî's *Pramanavarttika*:

- Amid the attitude of the ordinary, non-nirvanic, empirical consciousness (*Dukkha*), where a conscious being does not observe flashing quantum abstract atoms, but rather observes extension (surfaces, colours, and duration—i.e., it is erroneously believed that extension and time are real), it is believed that an enduring, isolated self exists.

- The self wants to survive: the self discussed above also involves a (sometimes ferocious) desire to exist, to persist through time.
- The self wants to protect itself: the self will feel threat to that which is perceived to in any way harm the continual existence of the self.
- Parts of what might be believed to be a threat to the self are other people (what are erroneously believed to be 'other' isolated, persisting selves). Thus, other persons who are perceived to be a threat to the existence of the self will be considered an enemy and thus will be hated or attacked, either overtly or covertly.
- The illusory isolated self will seek out what it perceives are the best (most safe and most favourable) conditions for it, including removing any threats.
- There are limited things (land, resources, money) that non-nirvanic denizens of Dukkha all try to acquire and people inevitably compete for these.
- Therefore ordinary, non-nirvanic, empirical consciousness inevitably involves spite, hostility and violence toward what it perceives as other isolated selves (i.e., other people).
- Notice that this finite regress starts with the illusory belief in an enduring isolated self. If there is an understanding that the persisting self does not exist, then the conclusion of this argument would not be manifested in the behaviour of conscious beings. Buddhist ethics are an entirely foreign sort of ethics, compared to that which is found in the contemporary world. In Buddhism there is no good and evil; '[t]he basis of [Buddhist] ethics is extremely simple. Nothing is intrinsically good or bad. It is just flashing atoms' (Ricard and Thuan, 2001: 19). Reality, according to the mereological nihilist interpretation of Buddhism is neither good nor evil; it is only the Buddhist quantum abstract atoms. But in contemporary culture it is ubiquitously believed by the world citizens that there is evil all around—namely 'in other people' (that are perceived as threats to the illusory self).

### **Vibrating Quantum Abstract Atoms do not have Moral Properties**

So far it has been shown that only flashing atoms exist and that deluded Samsaric selves inevitably hate one another. The very popular theories

of moral realism and relativism do not work, as the violence-ridden world demonstrates. The correct thesis of morality is desperately needed by the world citizens and that thesis is moral nihilism. Moral nihilism involves the idea that there is no good or evil, and thus there is no good or evil that has been done to me. Rather, there is only the suffering of Samsaric agents which needs to be quelled by nirvanic release. Now it will be shown that quantum blob theory leads to moral nihilism and quantum moral nihilism is the essential position a conscious being must emanate in order to remember that one is deep Buddhistic compassion (and moral realism or moral relativism are the enemies of genuine compassion).

If the no-nonsense eliminativism of the mereological nihilist interpretation of quantum Buddhism is the correct account of reality, we can discuss all of reality in terms of mere vibration (momentariness, durationlessness) of propertyless, immaterial and indistinguishable quantum Buddhist atoms. This leads to a question: How can the vibration of quantum atoms be evil, or be good? If atoms only vibrate (flash in and out of existence), and if atoms are the only real entities, then there is nothing else about the atoms, or about reality, to make them this way or that way. Hence, they are indistinguishable from one another, and are incapable of being good or bad (they are incapable of possessing moral properties). In other words, if there is only atomic vibration, then nowhere can anyone call some vibrational 'events' evil and others not, because vibration of quantum abstract atoms is not intrinsically evil or good. If so, it is not clear why some quantum vibrations could be considered 'good' and others 'evil'.

Furthermore, if blob theory is the correct theory of reality, then it bolsters the thesis: vibrational quantum non-matter cannot have intrinsic value, since it cannot possess properties such as goodness, evil and so forth.

## **Nihilism and Inaction**

### ***Moral Nihilism I***

Moral nihilism is typically resisted by many philosophers, due to the fact that philosophers around the world associate nihilism with an absence of morality that leads to an absence of compassion, which, in turn, leads to pervasive violence and hate. But such a position is entirely incorrect. Moral nihilism does not lead to absence of compassion, but

rather it is just the opposite. It is the base for developing deep nirvanic compassion. Moral nihilism, in fact, is founded in an absence of concern for anything in culture or about the self. More specifically, it is founded in a rejection of importance of, and moral value in, anything illusory (i.e., an unconcern for the self or for anything material). Moral non-nihilism (i.e., placing importance and value on that which is illusion, *Dukkha*) leads to placing importance on some material entities over others, where the latter will be viewed as less important. The nihilistic (morally nihilistic) nirvanic observer is unmoved by material phenomena since she understands that they are not real. A consequence of this position is that she cannot formulate moral preferences about material things; she will see that materiality does not contain any moral properties since materiality does not exist. She will not be able to, for example, understand that one physical body (such as a Jewish body) is any better or worse than another one (such as a Muslim body),<sup>4</sup> since physical bodies do not exist. Consequently, if the moral nihilist is called to war in order to oppress and/or kill material bodies whom she has been told need to be controlled or killed, in her nirvanic foundation she will be unable to move, due to the fact that she will see that the material world does not exist, and cannot be sought after or repelled, pursued or rejected.

Conversely, it is the non-nihilistic, non-nirvanic observer who almost always tends to be a moral realist or moral relativist, illusorily believing that the self and material things are real—who will develop ideas that some material things are good, and others are bad, for the self, wherein some material items need to be grasped or hoarded, and others need to be attacked or obliterated. It is the non-nihilist, then, who is prone to, and capable of violence, while it is impossible for the Buddhist moral nihilist to muster up enough physical bodily movement to hurt a single person in any way.

### *Moral Nihilism II*

Moral nihilism is not often discussed other than in brief passages that often tend to give varying definitions of what moral nihilism is. Let me be clear that moral nihilism is not a rejection of ethics, for such a view is contradictory: the rejection of ethical positions would prevent a philosopher from holding any position, such as the preference for the position of moral nihilism. Rather, moral nihilism is an ethical position where



one value is held: the moral nihilist asserts that it is ethical to reject the value or importance and value of human behaviour (physical bodily behaviour), and of any physical event or item. In other words, moral nihilism involves a rejection over that which does not exist. This moral nihilism is not the thesis that it matters not at all what we do, as is often associated with Nietzsche (Ellin, 1995: 76–77). But rather, moral nihilism is the thesis that there is nothing to do. There are no choices to make, no preferences to defend, no goods to hoard, and no enemies to fear. There is only nirvana.

In this article, for reasons given above, descriptions of moral nihilism that are not in accord to what has been written above are rejected, such as the following, which supposedly derives from the theory of ethical relativism:

Moral absolutism holds that there is a single true morality. Moral relativism claims instead: .... There is no single true morality. There are many different moral frameworks, none of which is more correct than others.

Moral nihilism can be compared to religious nihilism. Religious nihilism can be compared to the conclusion that there is no single true religion but only many different outlooks, none of which is more correct than the others ... .Moral nihilism argues that the same is true of morality: ... there is no point to engaging in morality and moral judgments. (Harman and Thomson, 2000: 5–6)

According to Harmon and Thomson's analysis, if relativism is true then nihilism is true. This conditional link is tenuous. Harmon and Thomson want us to believe that if there are enough morals (moral relativity) then there are none (moral nihilism). Perhaps this is analogous to asserting that if enough light exists in reality, then the reality will become dark. This would appear to be a contradiction, and thus another definition of moral nihilism would be more appropriate, such as the one given here. According to Harmon and Thomson's passage, humans have many values, all of which are equally right. This is not moral nihilism (there are no morals), but rather radical relativism (there are many 'even-level' morals). Buddhist moral nihilism is concerned with an entirely different issue than this sort of relativism: the rejection of any importance of any life-form's behaviour. It is this lack of importance that is what moral nihilism actually involves.

Realism and relativism which are concerned with the activities and beliefs of 'isolated selves' (which do not really exist) lead to action, and, *ipso facto*, lead to violence. Nihilism is realized in the nirvanic state of no-self and *ipso facto*, can only involve inaction and peace.

### **Subjectivity and Buddhist Compassion**

The dynamo of Buddhism—compassion—follows from quantum moral nihilism. In fact reality can be viewed from two perspectives: illusory (ordinary empirical reality, Dukkha) and real (nirvanic). A careful analysis of reality through both of these perspectives reveals an interesting issue: there are no distinctions between conscious beings. This follows from the findings in the analysis of mereological nihilism and moral nihilism above and it is a realization of subjective Buddhist compassion when one remembers (realizes) that they are nirvanic. Now it will be shown why non-nirvanic humans can be shown to be indistinguishable: if you feel a pain or joy, I feel it too, regardless of whether or not my awareness is awakened enough to understand that I am feeling your feeling. This is the most genuine definition of compassion: to feel the other directly and to remember that you are the other.

### ***Compassion is the Amalgamation of Subjectivities***

Humans are not bodies, but rather are subjectivities, so if we are to genuinely experience and feel one another (if we are to exhibit genuine compassion), it is not ultimately through body contact (which is illusory touching), but rather via mind-to-mind contact (which is a sort of telepathic direct contact). But as is well-known, if any things are able to actually contact, they become indistinguishable. To understand this, first consider the following passage from Chisholm (1989: 84):

Let us recall an ancient problem. 'Consider two discrete physical bodies thought to be continuous with each other; the east side of body A, say, is continuous with the west side of body B. How is this possible? Either (i) the eastmost part of A is in the same place as is the westmost part of B or (ii) no part of A occupies the same place as does any part of B. In the case of (i), we would have two discrete things in the same place. But this is impossible.<sup>5</sup> In the case of (ii), since A and B occupy different places, there is a place between the place where A is and the place where B is. But if there is a place between A and B, then A and B are not continuous.'

Chisholm's argument indicates that there cannot be contact, abutting or touching unless there are items that are coinciding in time or space, whereby there can be contact or integration of the entities that are touching. If two things are to directly touch, they must occupy each other's being, and if they occupy each other's being, then they are not separate, and if they are not separate, they are not two, they are one: they amalgamate (integrate, unify). For this reason, if two people (subjectivities) contact one another, they are one subjectivity.

What has just been described is the illusion involved in the idea that consciousnesses (subjectivities) are distinguishable from one another: if there is any interaction between persons (consciousnesses), they must be one consciousness. Dispelling this illusion of separateness is a key tenet of Buddhism and Buddhist compassion, as this passage about Mahāyāna compassion illustrates:

Sāntideva persuasively ... argue[s] that indifference to the suffering of 'others' is as absurd as indifference to one's 'own' suffering ... . In his *Bodhi-caryāvātāra*, ... [h]e advocates that one who sees the equality of self and other should heroically practise 'the exchange of self for others' ... the 'highest secret' which benefits both self and other ... . In this practice, one looks on another, lowly, person as 'I' and on oneself as one would know someone else. (Harvey, 2000: 125–126)

### ***The Feeling Mass***

If right actions do not come from bodies or from moral properties, then where do they come from? The answer is: from what a conscious being actually is, which is subjectivity (consciousness). If moral nihilism reveals that there is no value in any self or any material item, then how does the Buddhist become compassionate? Buddhist moral nihilism involves the realization that there is no value in self or materiality since they are not real and thus the nihilist's attention is shifted to what is real—which is subjectivity (specifically, nirvanic subjectivity)—and by doing that, the nirvanic nihilist understands that you are not you, you are me, and if I love myself, I can only love you also and that is a basis for deep Buddhistic nihilistic compassion. It is feeling-based, rather than idea-based. Subjectivity generates compassion, which in turn generates

right action (which is not-doing or compassion), which in turn generates love for all life-forms. It is from this basic Buddhist inwardness that genuine compassion emerges, rather than from ideas or ethical doctrines of physical items.

Why subjectivities cannot be distinct? If I hear a loud sound that startles me, there is no reason to imagine that the person next to me is feeling differently. Our feelings are, it seems, indistinguishable, since there is no way to define them as distinct. It may be erroneously believed by the persons involved that their feelings are separate, but how would they be? Do their feelings have a difference in intensity? This does not seem likely, since we can verify that subjectivity from one instance of startledness to another, the feelings of startledness are identical. If I am startled by a loud noise in the year 2008, a subjective feeling is generated, and if I am startled by a very similar loud noise in 2009, an indistinguishable feeling is generated (it can be verified through introspection—through observation of feelings that this is so). If my feelings are indistinguishable in this way, then why would I assume that the person next to me is feeling something different when she is startled? Feeling is feeling, so how can my feeling be different or significantly dissimilar from another? In fact all subjective feelings are uniform and indistinguishable, as if there is just one ‘feeling mass’ within us, as Gendlin (1997: 13) has noted:

Above and beyond the symbols there is always also the feeling referent itself. Always it is concretely and definitely there, present for you, an inward sensing.

Let us move from these very simple examples to more complex ones. Consider a sentence: ‘What is the law of supply and demand?’ In what way do you have your meaning of the sentence? Of course, the sentence is objective, spoken or written. But for you, how do you have its meaning—what it is to you? You have it in your experiencing . . . . Does it have meaning for you or not? If it is in a language you know and makes sense, then you have an experiential sense of its meaning. Where do you find such an experiential sense of meaning? Again, it is in the same location, with the same inward reference of attention to *the ever present feeling mass* that you find meaning. The sentence, of course, consists of the verbal noises (or auditory images of noises). But their meaning? It is felt by you. (emphasis added)

There is a vibrational orb of raw feeling that comprises the core and the dynamo of each conscious being's subjectivity. Typically, conscious beings do not see it, because their attention is not focused on the inner (the subjective), but rather is focused on the outer (the illusory, the empirical extensions). But upon the initiation of Buddhist meditation, this 'feeling mass' is discovered (remembered) to be a primary 'ingredient' and dynamo of subjectivity. Gendlin (*ibid.*: 3) elaborates on this:

... [W]e cannot consider experience to be a logically schematic construct, no matter how complex. At best we can have a scheme of how experience and logic can relate. Even then, experience must be referred to directly—it must be thought of as that partly unformed stream of feeling that we have every moment. I shall call it 'experiencing', using that term for the flow of feeling, concretely, to which you can every moment attend inwardly, if you wish.

He also writes:


First, feel your body. Your body can, of course, be looked at from the outside, but I am asking you to feel it from the inside. There you are. There, as simply put as possible, is your experiencing of this moment, now. But we need to remain with that global feel of your body. Let us 'divide it a bit, although no hard and fast division into parts is readily possible. (*ibid.*: 12)

In the first of the above three passages given from Gendlin, he appears to maintain that non-emotive, verbal concepts interact with the preconceptual, unchanging, primordial feeling mass, and this 'interaction' or 'interplay' gives rise to meaningful subjectivity. It is this interplay that gives rise to the meanings we have in our mental life.

Meaning is formed in the interaction of ... [the feeling mass] and something that functions as a symbol ... . [W]hen one employs symbols to attend to ... [the feeling mass], it changes. The effort is ... to 'observe' feeling [the feeling mass] and then say what it means ... . The 'meanings' of [the feeling mass] ... as such are 'preconceptual' ... . Philosophy requires another Copernican Revolution to recognize ... [the feeling mass] as a centre of consideration in its own right, not merely as revolving around the requirements of logical constructions. (*ibid.*: 8–9)



Consider the following Diagram 2.1 that illustrates Gendlin's theorization:



When a conscious being is unaware of (i.e., forgets) these inner dynamics, she has no possibility for nirvanic release. But when the conscious being is aware of (remembers) the feeling-mass-dynamo, there is the possibility of nirvanic release, since being aware of it is to look at it, and to look at it is to see into it, and to see into it is to find the nirvanic explosion residing at the core of the feeling mass, where it has always been and thus the nirvanic observer remembers what she really is.

This analysis of the feeling mass shows how feeling is not a protean or many-faced subjective item. When it is directly apprehended, it is always indistinguishable from any other 'state' of the feeling mass. Therefore, feeling only has one form or intensity.

***The Feeling Mass is Indistinguishable from Present Moment to Present Moment***

The concept of the feeling mass allows us to see that feeling—the primary dynamo of subjectivity (of personhood)—is not distinguishable between conscious beings. This is a key finding in the study of Buddhist compassion. But a few more details need to be worked out before it is ascertained that this is the case.

Gendlin refers to the feeling mass as 'unformed', '[a]bove and beyond ... symbols', '[a]lways ... concretely and definitely there',

'[always] present for you', 'ever present', and 'in the same location', at 'the same inward reference of attention' (ibid.: 13). He also refers to it as 'pre-logical' and indivisible (as if it is an atomic item). If we combine all these descriptions of the subjective feeling mass, we find that Gendlin's comments apparently indicate that the feeling mass might be indistinguishable from moment to moment. In other words, the feeling mass is a constant (vibrating) whirl of feeling-energy that inundates, pierces, and largely comprises subjectivity, but which always contains indistinguishable humming feeling from instant to instant: the same glowing, pulsating hum of explosion and feeling every time that a conscious being looks at it—that is, every time consciousness genuinely exists as self-consciousness.

The feeling mass vibrates,<sup>6</sup> that means it has continual new states of existence, perhaps trillions, where with each new state there is new feeling mass subjectivity (as if states of the feeling mass replace one another with new, indistinguishable states), but where each new feeling mass subjectivity is indistinguishable from the previous. This can be merely verified by any subjective observer who brings perception to subjectivity (rather than affixing it to the ordinary empirical reality of surfaces, colours and Dukkha), wherein is found (remembered) the ever-present radiance of the feeling mass. Searching for it is perhaps the first step toward direct apprehension of the timeless nirvanic lotus.

Hubert Benoit, a Frenchman who writes about Zen philosophy, also writes about the feeling mass, where he calls it 'metaphysical distress' and 'primordial distress', rather than the feeling mass. He also indicates that it is in and through this distress (primitive, unformed, vibrating feeling) that nirvanic eternity is remembered:

... there is another distress, a permanent distress ... . Behind the phenomenal ... distress, felt on the plane of phenomena, there is a noumenal, or metaphysical distress, which dwells up-stream of my phenomena ... . First of all it is unconscious. The man who has not attained Realization is conscious of phenomena only; he could not, therefore, be conscious of a distress which is up-stream of phenomena ... . Unconscious metaphysical distress, then, is also characterized by permanence. It is always there, always the same, behind all our affective phenomena ... . Because the perfect existential Felicity is not awakened in the centre of [the natural] man everything happens as if his centre were occupied by a primordial distress. (Benoit, 1990: 79–80)

### ***Beings are Indistinguishable***

Subjectivity only contains one feeling state. Thus, it is unclear why other conscious beings would have different feeling states. If subjectivity reveals that all my feeling states are indistinguishable, existing as energetic indistinguishable feeling mass states, then by induction, the best inference would be that 'other' conscious beings I witness would also exist as a feeling-mass-subjectivity of pre-conceptual vibrational radiance. If this is so, then these 'other' conscious beings are feeling mass emanations that are not distinct from me. The Benoitian metaphysical/primordial distress can be witnessed on the face of a non-nirvanic being. Even if the non-nirvanic being is not aware of (has forgotten) their primordial feeling mass, their feeling-mass-distress can be 'sensed' by another mindful observer emanating from their illusory physical body. Thus, it can be verified that all conscious beings are a subjective feeling mass. For this reason, I will inductively conclude that the inner orb of vibrational feeling mass is indistinguishable between conscious beings. A conscious being is their subjectivity, and since the feeling mass is the dynamo of subjectivity, then conscious beings are indistinguishable. Understanding this is to understand that conscious beings are indistinguishable and it is a step toward understanding Buddhist compassion. If subjectivities cannot be distinguished, then they are one: if I feel sorrow, you feel the same sorrow, whether you are aware of it or not. For these reasons, if I can feel love for myself (self-conscious, self-love for the conscious subjectivity that I am), I can only feel love for all 'other' subjectivities, which are really not distinct from mine. This simple finding is forgotten by the masses of contemporary humans of prison planet, who imagine that they are separate and that if, for example, persons in Iraq or Africa are killed, it does not affect them—as if consciousness remains constant upon the deaths of families in the aforementioned nations. This illusion is absurd.

### **Final Comments**

There are harsh criticisms of the Buddha that Hindu's have presented. For example, the Buddha tells us that it is the aggregates that transform when one attains nirvana, but he also says that there is enlightenment, but this apparently means that nothing is enlightened. The first half of the last sentence implies that there is something that is undergoing transformation and the second half implies there is not. The discussion of quantum Buddhist compassion in this article solves this issue:

quantum abstract atoms are nirvanic, which is realized (remembered) through right mindfulness, where mindfulness is subjective-experiential stillness which all Buddhist philosophy emanates from (and where it is false that philosophy is understood before mindfulness, as if mindfulness emanates from philosophy), as discussed in a lucid passage from Dreyfus (1997: 98):

Buddhism teaches that human beings can liberate themselves from suffering through a correct understanding of reality. We usually understand reality through perception and from wrong views, such as the substantial existence of persons, on the basis of these experiences. So the first step in a Buddhist liberative strategy is to gain a clear understanding of experiences. This is achieved by developing mindfulness toward the four kinds of objects: body, feeling, consciousness, and mental factors.

This article presents an account of quantum Buddhism that is scientific and thus which all conscious beings hopefully will realize must be accorded with if they are not to be deluded and forlorn beings. The arguments of this article should lead to an end to ignorance (war, physicalism, corporatism, consumerism, etc.,) worldwide. If world citizens understand that perfect felicity, stillness and peace resides within them and comprises them, at this very moment, perhaps they could be persuaded to walk away from their current lives—which are lives that only have made them unsatisfied creatures of horror and hate, sadness and shallow ignorance—and return to what they are.

## Notes

1. In an article I point out why this is a quantum mechanical theory which is more in accord with actual empirical quantum findings than any other interpretation of quantum physics (such as the Bohmian interpretation, the Copenhagenian interpretation, the many-world interpretation and so forth). Grupp (2006b).
2. See Grupp (2006b) for a detailed discussion of these issues.
3. Dreyfus (1997: 146) writes: ‘It is often said that Dharmakīrti is a nominalist. Dravid, for example, says about him: “However, it must be granted that the Buddhist is the most thoroughgoing nominalist in the history of thought.”’

Dreyfus later discusses how he holds that Dharmakīrti's nominalism is a conceptualist theory.

4. I use the terms 'Muslim' and 'Jewish' here not to denote any biological differences between the two, but rather to denote cultural labels and purported cultural differences that people commonly and thoughtlessly maintain exist between these groups (and usually where political figures coax them into doing so).
5. This claim may be false since it may be the case that quantum theory reveals particles, such as electrons and photons, to routinely collocate in space. But if this is the case, it is not relevant to my reasoning in this article, and thus this point made by Chisholm can merely be ignored, at least with respect to this article.
6. Elsewhere, Gendlin (1997) refers to the feeling mass as 'flowing'. It would appear that he means this to be synonymous with the word 'vibrating', as I have used it. Gendlin refers to the feeling mass as flowing, but also as being at the same location, which implies that the flowing (or vibrating) is stationary. The only ways I know that something can flow (move) in some way while remaining stationary is by either rotating (as if on an axis, for example), by pulsating, or by flashing in-and-out of existence (replacing), much like a Buddhist quantum atom does. Since Gendlin does not refer to the feeling mass as rotating, his 'flowing' must be one of the latter two options—pulsating or replacing. This would amount to the feeling mass being an entity that is flowing but also is both stationary (at the same location). For this reason, we can ask the following question: Is Gendlin's feeling mass changing or unchanging? Gendlin himself appears very unclear, even contradictory on this issue. At some points Gendlin appears to specifically say that it is unchanging; but at many other places, he specifically says that it is changing. For these reasons, I assert that his implying that the feeling mass is flowing (changing), but indistinguishable from moment to moment, indicates that the feeling mass is vibrational.

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